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This chapter focuses on informal crossings of undocumented Palestinian workers from the 
southern West Bank to Israel. Relying on ethnographic data, it studies the modes of 
organization and the ramifications of this border crossing economy throughout the post-
Intifada period (2007-2010). It highlights the extent to which Israeli state authorities have de 
facto managed to involve informal actors in controls of Palestinian mobility.  
While Palestinian employment in Israel has been extensively documented, little attention has 
been paid to the tactics involved in illegal passages into Israel. In the 1980s and 1990s, 
research has mostly focused on the changing role of the Palestinian population within the 
Israeli economy. Scholars have described how Palestinian workers, seen as a highly desirable, 
cheap, flexible and mobile labour force from the 1970s until the end of the 1980s (Portugali 
1989), were increasingly perceived as a security threat after the outbreak of the first Intifada 
(1987-1993). They have documented the way that movement restrictions (Hass 2001) have 
reduced the number of work permits and marginalized their presence in the Israeli economy 
(Farsakh 2005, Arnon et al., 1997), a process that accelerated during the years 2000 to 2010 
(Mansour 2010, Etkes 2011, Ekstein 2011). Following the second Intifada (2000-2004) and 
the Gaza War (2006), the entry of Palestinians has been further limited by Israeli 
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governments. In 2011, Palestinian workers represented only 2% (Ekstein 2011) of the Israeli 
work force, compared with 7% in 1987 (Portugali 1989). 
Yet, in concentrating on the shrinking role of Palestinians within the Israeli economy, this 
literature has overlooked the parallel rise and professionalization of an informal economy of 
border crossing. As in many other border contexts (Andreas 2001), the escalation of controls 
forced labourers to resort to new tactics in their attempts to transit the reinstated „border zone‟ 
between Israel and the Occupied Territories. The first to focus on this development was the 
anthropologist Avram Bornstein who carried out fieldwork in the northern West Bank in the 
late 1990s. Already there were many more Israeli checkpoints and random patrols along the 
Green Line,
2
 when Bornstein (2002) began his study of routes taken by Palestinian workers 
and contractors to reach work sites in Israel. Later research described how crossing into Israel 
became more difficult due to tighter controls (B‟tselem 2007a, 2007b). Palestinians 
improvised new tactics (Parizot 2004, Kelly 2006, ch. 4), skills and knowledge in order to 
find a way through the cracks in Israel‟s surveillance system (Amiry 2010, Bontemps 2011). 
Others took advantage of business opportunities generated by the difficulties faced by 
Palestinian workers looking for jobs in Israel. In this way, they fostered the emergence of a 
new „border economy‟ (Parizot 2008).  
The term „border economy‟ refers first to the „industry of crossing‟ (Hernandez-Leon 2008) in 
which formal and informal entrepreneurs are de facto participants, alongside the State 
institutions¸ in the process of regulating mobility across boundaries. It also refers to new types 
of economic activities that emerge in and structure border areas. This is not simply a question 
of readjusting the shape and range of cross-boundary networks set up by workers, smugglers, 
employers, and state institutions: it also affects the nature of relationships linking these 
various actors by creating new power relations, antagonisms, and forms of exploitation 
(Parizot 2004, 2008).  
This article will pursue an earlier analysis of this „border economy‟ in order to understand 
how it affects and contributes to readjustments to Israeli control mechanisms. Until now, there 
has been little interest in the implications of informal activities for Israeli control procedures. 
Scholars and observers in this field have mostly sought to document the hardship of daily life 
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in Palestine and the way the Palestinian people resist and denounce injustices resulting from 
Israel‟s separation policy. My aim here is neither to neglect the suffering of Palestinians, nor 
to fall in with the discourse of resistance. On the one hand, observing human behaviour 
through the prism of resistance can often be misleading. John Comaroff (1993) has shown that 
using such an approach often leads to the observer‟s interpretation being projected onto the 
people observed. As Lila Abu Lughod (1990) states, it tends to overestimate the capacity of 
the powerless. It also reinforces a binary construct of the conflict, based on the opposition of 
Israeli against Palestinian, which neglects other significant interactions between these 
protagonists. On the other hand, by focusing solely on how Palestinian lives have been 
reshaped by Israeli controls, scholars limit their focus to the sociology of power.
3
 By taking a 
different approach, i.e. by examining how Palestinians adapt and take advantage of faults and 
opportunities created by the Israeli surveillance system, we can obtain a more dynamic and 
nuanced understanding of the way this system operates. 
My argument here is that, despite the small numbers of Palestinian workers smuggled daily, 
the emergence of this informal economy has deep ramifications for both Israeli and 
Palestinian societies. It establishes a variety of networks linking groups and actors that are 
usually thought to be independent. By taking into account the multiplicity of participants 
(Palestinians and Israelis, Jews and Arabs) in the border economy and the nature of their 
relationships with Israeli authorities, I shall demonstrate that they are in fact fully integrated 
in the mechanisms regulating the movement of Palestinians.  
This chapter draws on ethnographic data I have collected since the mid-1990s in the southern 
part of the West Bank between the Jebel al-Khalîl (South Hebron Hills) and the northern 
Negev. Thanks to my ability to travel freely with a French passport and the networks I 
developed on „both sides‟ of the Israel/Palestine divide, I was able to interview Palestinian 
workers, watchers, drivers, and contractors, as well as Israeli employers (Jews and Arabs 
living inside Israel and settlers in the West Bank), smugglers, and representatives of Israel‟s 
army and police. By comparing this data to other observations from previous visits to 
clandestine points of passage and taking into account prior research, I concluded that the 
dynamics observed in the southern West Bank are indicative of a wider trend found 
throughout the border zones between the West Bank and Israel.  
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I will first describe the changing nature of the borders between Israel and the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories and how this has affected the passage of Palestinian workers into Israel 
over the last 20 years. This will be followed by an assessment of how this new context has 
progressively favoured the emergence of a well-organized informal border economy. Finally, 
by focusing on the ramifications of this economy, I will examine how it has become an 
integral part of informal Israeli controls of Palestinian mobility. 
1967-2011: FROM OPEN BORDERS TO SEPARATION 
Palestinians were first hired to work in Israel after the annexation of the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip in 1967. Since then, their place in the Israeli economy and society has changed 
considerably, as have their conditions of living and border crossing. Between the early 1970s 
and 1987, they were fully integrated in the Israeli economy. The fact that most of them did not 
have work permits was not considered to be an issue (Portugali 1989). However, after the first 
Intifada (1987-1993), they were seen as a growing security threat which led the Israeli 
authorities to impose tight restrictions as a way of regulating and monitoring their mobility. 
Though introduced as ad hoc security measures, these regulations became the basis for a 
systematic policy of separation.  
From integration to separation 
Contrary to Israeli‟s expectations, employment of Palestinian workers did not prevent them 
from rebelling against the colonial regime imposed after the Six Day War in 1967.
4
 Between 
1987 and 1993, Palestinian political factions called for a number of coordinated actions that 
would free them from economic dependence on Israel: general strikes, refusal to pay taxes, 
and boycotts of Israeli products. Palestinians were encouraged to stop working for Israeli 
employers in both the private and public sectors. These actions had a profound impact on both 
the Israeli and the Palestinian economy. In parallel with these campaigns of pacific resistance, 
there were confrontations between Palestinian demonstrators and the Israeli army in the West 
Bank and Gaza, including acts of sabotage and attacks against Israeli employers‟ worksites. 
In order to counter this rebellion, the Israeli authorities resorted to different measures. Inside 
the Occupied Territories, they introduced curfews and closure (Hass 2001). They also set up 
checkpoints along the main roads linking the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to Israel. Between 
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1989 and 1991, Palestinians working in Israel were required to carry magnetic cards and work 
permits (Hass 2001, Abu Zahra 2007). In 1993, the Israeli government created new quotas for 
Palestinians working in specific sectors (OECD 2010) and entry into Jerusalem (which had 
been annexed in 1967) was restricted to permit holders. 
Although these steps were originally introduced as ad hoc counterinsurgency measures, they 
gradually became an integral component in a more systematic policy to separate Palestinians 
from Israelis (Hass 2002). The objective was not solely to prevent unwanted individuals 
entering Israel, but also to cut back on the number of Palestinian workers. It was thought that 
these steps would reduce Israel‟s dependency on Palestinian workers and thus the country‟s 
vulnerability to Palestinian resistance (Grinberg 2011). By the late 1980s, Palestinians 
represented around 7% of the Israeli workforce (OECD 2010, 213) and, in strategic sectors 
such as agriculture and construction, 49% and 45% respectively. It was not until massive 
numbers of workers arrived from Asia and Africa in the early 1990s, that the Israeli 
government could enforce restrictions on the movement of Palestinians (Kemp 2004). 
Two other factors favoured implementation of the separation policy introduced by the Labor 
government elected in 1992. First, in September 1993, the signature of the Agreement of 
Principle between Israel and the PLO
5
 presaged the gradual introduction of autonomy for 
Palestinians and, in the long term, the possibility of the creation of an independent Palestinian 
State (Grinberg 2007, Latte Abdallah and Parizot 2011). In this context, the international 
community began to recognize the legitimacy of steps already taken by Israel to end their 
responsibility for the economic well-being of the Palestinian population, particularly with the 
arrival of international aid and funding for the process of establishing a Palestinian State. 
Second, rising tensions between the Israeli government and the newly created Palestinian 
Authority, together with increased violence between the two populations
6
 (Smith 2007) gave 
the Israeli government additional reasons for reinforcing its policy of separation.  
Yet, by the end of the 1990s, this policy did not in fact create a territorial division between 
Israeli and Palestinian territories. Rather, it fostered the emergence of a complex patchwork of 
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Palestinian enclaves encircled by Israeli-controlled areas (Map 1). Even though Israel 
withdrew from Palestinian towns and delegated their administration to the newly created 
Palestinian Authority, it nevertheless reinforced its controls. Prior to the second Intifada 
(2000), the Palestinian Authority was responsible for security in only 18% of the West Bank. 
In B areas, which represent another 22%, it had to cooperate with Israel while the remaining 
60% was fully under Israeli control.  
Materialization of Separation and Control of Mobility 
During the second Intifada (2000-2004), the Israeli authorities relied on a double-edged 
strategy: they reinforced the process of separation between the two populations and they 
attempted to regain security control over the Palestinian cities and villages from which they 
had withdrawn in the 1990s (Latte Abdallah and Parizot 2011). 
To achieve this objective, controls of the entry of Palestinians into Israel were further 
tightened. In fall 2000, the number of permits was reduced, which led a sharp drop of the 
number of Palestinian workers in Israel (see Table 1) which remained very low until 2004. 
Despite a slight increase since 2004, the number of permits issued in 2011 was still much 
lower than in 2000. In addition, the criteria of eligibility in terms of biosocial and security 
issues have been redefined and are more stringent (Etkess 2011). In 2002, the Israeli Prime 
Minister, Ariel Sharon, launched the construction of the Barrier/Wall
7
 around the West Bank 
(Rabinowitz 2003), as a way of preventing the passage of suicide bombers.
8
 By creating a 
physical barrier, the number of „points of passage‟ (ma’avarim [in Hebrew]) was reduced and 
security checks could be more thorough (Havkin 2008, 2011). The construction of these 
„terminals‟ moved the checkpoints further east, as many were placed along the Barrier, rather 
than on the Green Line (Havkin 2008, 2011), as 85% of the route now lay inside the old 
armistice line (UNOCHA 2011a). This also led to some controls being allocated to private 
companies which, since 2006, were now responsible for most of the checkpoints along the 
Wall (Havkin 2011). 
It was then decided to extend surveillance of Palestinian movements beyond the Wall by 
including all the C areas in the border zone. However, it was not possible to have uniform 
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controls of movement in these areas, since different regulations were established for specific 
places. New military zones were identified and restrictions placed on Palestinians‟ ability to 
access Israeli settlements and bypass roads by Palestinians. In order to implement these 
restrictions, the Israeli army had to deploy additional road blocks near and around Palestinian 
enclaves. According to United Nations officers, the number of checkpoints, barriers, trenches, 
earth mounds, and road blocks remained relatively stable: 605 in February 2005 (end of the 
Second Intifada) and 589 in July 2010 (UNOCHA 2005, 2010).  
The southern West Bank offers a good illustration of the impact this policy had on the local 
population. From mid-1996 to 2002, there was only one checkpoint between the Negev and 
the Southern West Bank: Meitar/Wadi al-Khalîl (Map 2), which monitored the passage of 
Palestinians and Israelis entering the West Bank from the south on Route 60. When the policy 
of confinement was launched in spring 2002, Palestinian villages and cities were temporarily 
re-occupied by the Israeli troops and long-term curfews and closures were introduced. In 
2004, new checkpoints and roadblocks separated the South Hebron hills from Hebron and the 
rest of the West Bank. Later in the same year, after a suicide bombing in the Israeli city of 
Beer Sheva (August 2004), two additional checkpoints were installed south of the Samû‟-
Yatta enclave, blocking the two remaining roads giving access to Israel, and another 
checkpoint was added west of Ramadhin. In 2006, before completing the Separation Barrier 
along the Green Line, the army built an additional concrete wall (1.20m high) along Route 
317 to prevent access to Palestinian cars from the North. This „obstacle‟ (mekhshol [in 
Hebrew]) was removed in 2008, but access to bypass roads remained restricted for private 
vehicles for at least another year. Even though, a period of relative calm in the region, 
between 2007 and 2010, led to many roadblocks being lifted near the Samû‟-Yatta and Dûra-
Dhahriyya enclaves, surveillance along and close to the Separation Barrier was reinforced.  
As in the rest of the West Bank, these measures had a dramatic impact on the mobility of 
Palestinians between local towns and villages and into Israel. In addition, the number of 
Palestinian workers employed in Israel in 2011 remained low compared to 2000: according to 
the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, the figure was 60,000, of whom more than 50% 
entered without legal papers (Ekstein 2011, 10). Altogether, these workers represented 2.5% 
of the whole Israeli workforce and around 14% of workers in the West Bank. Even though the 
number of Palestinian employees in the Israeli job market has declined substantially since the 
first Intifada, they still hold a strategic role in some sectors such as construction and 
agriculture where they represent respectively 13% and 5.7% of the labour force. 
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Nevertheless, using statistics to assess the level of illegal crossings is problematic. First, these 
figures seem to underestimate the number of undocumented workers. Kav LaOved, an NGO 
advocating workers‟ rights in Israel, believes that they represent a much higher proportion of 
workers in Israel, with as many as twice the number of workers with permits (2009).
9
 Second, 
institutional categories cannot be considered to be reliable analytical tools, especially since 
they aim to construct and dissociate groups of people according to their definition of what is 
legal or illegal status (De Genova 2002). These workers do not live in a separate world: they 
are not merely interconnected, but they are often the same people. Palestinian workers with 
permits often stayed overnight in Israel in order to avoid the difficulties involved in crossing 
the Barrier. Thus, the same persons could be „legal‟ workers during the day and „illegal‟ 
aliens at night. Furthermore, many Palestinians purchased permits from Israeli go-betweens 
without actually having a place of work. They could show their permit at the checkpoint but 
in fact worked illegally in Israel. Many more people were involved in these informal practices 
than the statistics claim, particularly if one takes into account the large number of people 
involved in helping workers to circumvent Israeli surveillance.  
THE INFORMAL BORDER ECONOMY AND THE DIVISION OF LABOUR 
The development of a border economy began in the 1990s but, until the early 2000s, the 
techniques used to circumvent Israeli surveillance were somewhat makeshift (Bornstein 2002, 
Kelly 2006). When Israel tightened its surveillance during the second Intifada (2000-2004) 
and the post-Intifada period, the Palestinians were forced to rethink their methods of transport, 
reallocate tasks and discover new forms of coordination across borders. 
From an open transport market to a highly fragmented sector  
In the mid-1990s, a number of people became involved in helping Palestinians avoid 
checkpoints in the southern areas of the West Bank. For example, as few workers could afford 
to drive their own cars into Israel, Israeli Bedouins
10
and West Bank residents offered illegal 
minibus services. Sometimes Jewish and Arab employers would collect their workers from 
their homes. As in the north of the West Bank, drivers and contractors would plan their 
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journey according to the legal status of their passengers: if all the passengers had a permit, 
they could use the main roads, if not, they found ways to bypass the checkpoints (Kelly 2006).  
In the late 1990s, when Palestinian vehicles were not allowed to cross the Green Line, travel 
between Palestinian towns and Israeli work sites became more difficult. Previous systems 
broke down and new staging places had to be created. Most Palestinian workers had to choose 
whether to travel in an Israeli car, take the risk of entering in an illegal car, or change to an 
Israeli vehicle before crossing the barrier. In the short term, these new restrictions allowed the 
Negev Bedouins to take control of the transport business in Israel and, to a certain extent, in 
the southern West Bank, since, as Israeli citizens, they could travel freely between Israel 
proper and C areas in the West Bank.  
After 2000, the introduction of more obstacles forced drivers to limit their activities to 
specific sections and routes. First, Israeli Jewish contractors stopped driving into the 
Palestinian enclaves to fetch their employees, because they were worried by the increased 
violence, the army‟s reoccupation of the area, and a number of attacks against Israeli Jews. 
Those that were still willing to collect their undocumented workers preferred to pick them up 
only after they had passed the checkpoints into Israel.  
Because they are also Palestinians, Israeli Bedouin contractors and drivers were not worried 
about attacks from West Bank Palestinians, but the Israeli Army‟s re-occupation of 
Palestinian areas in 2002-2003 made it difficult for them to travel freely in the West Bank. 
Even after the army withdrew, their journeys were still hampered by road blocks, trenches, 
barriers and checkpoints. As a result, the Bedouin drivers also wanted to avoid picking up 
Palestinian workers until after they had crossed the Barrier.  
Finally, it became increasingly difficult and more complex for Palestinian workers to travel to 
the checkpoints and be picked up by an Israeli driver. In 2007, a worker living in the suburbs 
of Yatta could use his private car to go into the centre of town but once Route 317 was 
forbidden to private Palestinian cars, he had to take public transport to reach Dhahriyya. 
There he had to wait for a driver who would take him safely from Dhahriyya to the Fence by 
avoiding Israeli patrols. There an Israeli driver waited to take him to his destination. Thus in 
the late 2000s, he spent one to two hours to make the same journey that took only half-an-
hour before the second Intifada, even without leaving the West Bank.  
10 
 
As a result, drivers transporting undocumented Palestinian workers began to limit their 
activities to their own neighbourhood. They operated in specific areas in the West Bank and, 
with so many people involved, this necessitated a much higher level of coordination.  
Division of labour  
Since 2006 and the partial completion of the Barrier south of Dhahriyya and Yatta, Israel was 
able to channel the passage of undocumented workers and concentrate on establishing control 
over a small number of illegal crossing points: the areas around Ramadhin/Eshkolot, just 
north of the Wadi al-Khalîl/Meitar border terminal and of Masafer Yatta close to the Dead 
Sea (see Map 2). By tightening patrols in these areas, the nature of illegal crossings changed 
radically: in the late 1990s and early 2000s, drivers could still circumvent Israeli surveillance 
by taking alternative routes, but by the late 2000s, they literally had to confront Israeli 
checkpoints, i.e., they either had to force their way past border guards and army barriers in 
order to reach the Wall close to Ramadhin or cross the desert south of Yatta. In 2009-2010, 
large numbers of undocumented workers tried to cross into Israel on Saturday afternoons and 
evenings and this led to car chases between Israeli jeeps and Palestinian drivers (shoferiyya 
[in Arabic]). Drivers had to improve their driving skills if they wanted to outrun Israeli jeeps 
on a very rough terrain. As a result, crossing the barrier became increasingly dangerous with 
more Palestinian workers and their drivers being wounded or killed on these routes than in the 
past.
11
 
With a few exceptions, these drivers were no longer workers, contractors, or even workers 
engaged in smuggling. In the Yatta region, most were unmarried male adolescents or young 
men who wanted to take up this lucrative, but dangerous, business. Most came from a few 
large families already involved in this business, but some were recruited from other groups. 
On the Israeli side, the Bedouins also appeared to recruit additional drivers but, given risks 
involved, there was often a lack of volunteers. 
Drivers needed immediate and continuous updates on the whereabouts of the Israeli army, 
police and border guards. They had to set up networks of watchers or scouts who were sent 
ahead of convoys to check the roads for patrols. These were local residents or workers 
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employed by smugglers. Payment was sometimes in kind: for example, Sâlim Abu Jaffal
12
 
who worked in the Ramadhin/Eshkolot region in 2010, received prepaid SIM cards as 
payment for calling drivers from his lookout. 
Smugglers also relied on help from local peasants and their excavating equipment. They 
regularly needed to maintain and open up new routes to avoid Israeli surveillance, and to 
remove earth-mounds or refill trenches made by the army to block roads. As a result, these 
activities reshaped the local landscape by regularly readjusting the network of dirt roads along 
the Wall (see Photo 1). 
Last but not least, smugglers made use of local shopkeepers in towns along the routes taken 
by undocumented workers. In Dhahriyya, restaurants and hotels provided food, 
accommodation, and staging places where workers would gather before crossing. Local 
garages provided services and storage for unlicensed cars used for travel between the town 
and the Barrier. In addition, similar forms of cooperation were established on the other side of 
the Barrier. 
Business cooperation across borders 
Smugglers needed tight coordination for their activities across the separation line between 
Israel and the Occupied Territories. Nevertheless, allocation of territory for their activities did 
not lead to a fragmentation of the border economy, but rather resulted in a high level of 
rational and calculated integration. 
In 2010, in the area between the Southern West Bank and the North-East Negev, Palestinians 
and Bedouins maintained constant contact in order to agree on specific times and places 
where they could pick up and drop off workers along the Fence. Moreover, Bedouins needed 
to coordinate with other transporters (such as Israeli Arab or Jewish taxis and minibuses) who 
would then take Palestinian workers from local Bedouin towns to work in southern, western 
and northern Israel. 
In some regions, for example Dhahriyya/Ramadhin, smugglers on both sides worked together 
to force their way through Israeli patrols. In summer 2010, Palestinian drivers would lie in 
wait with their Mitsubishi truckloads of workers on the hill dominating the Barrier. Once 
informed by watchers that Israeli jeeps blocking the road had moved, they would rush 
downhill as fast as possible towards a hole in the Fence (Photo 2). On the other side, Bedouin 
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drivers would drive down to the Barrier and pick up the workers. By the time the Israeli jeeps 
hurried back, both sets of drivers had already disappeared.  
Coordination of drivers involved not only well-timed simultaneous operations but also the 
right number of cars on each side: Palestinian trucks could carry up to a dozen workers, but 
Bedouins drive cars that take only 5 to 7 people, doubling the number of cars required. 
These manoeuvres also involved coordinated financial transactions since workers only paid 
drivers when they reached their destination. A worker traveling from Dhahriyya to a Bedouin 
township in the Negev paid a fee (NIS 150
13
) to the Bedouin driver. Conversely, a Palestinian 
returning to Dhahriyya paid the Palestinian driver. These earnings had to be redistributed 
among the drivers on both sides of the border. 
Overall, these groups function as „entrepreneurs without borders‟, not just because they are 
involved in business cooperation across the barrier, but also because their activities and 
practices are regulated by informal contracts which apply to local groups operating on both 
sides in order to avoid sources of conflict. Coordination of their activities was particularly 
important, because the very lucrative nature of their business has attracted many newcomers 
and generated fierce competition among smugglers. In 2010, local Bedouin elders in Israel 
decided to force the various extended families involved to come to an agreement. The 
objective was twofold: fix the rules for people entering this lucrative market, and punish 
certain recurrent behaviour, including denunciation of competitors to the Israeli police.  
RAMIFICATIONS OF THE INFORMAL BORDER ECONOMY 
Over the last ten years, despite the small number of workers involved, informal crossings 
have not merely generated well-integrated business activities and partnerships, they have also 
had profound ramifications for the local business and social environment on both sides of the 
barrier, and in communities living near the Fence and further inside the West Bank. The 
impact of these ramifications is all the more impressive when we take into account the 
number of people who have tried to capitalize on these networks and crossing activities for 
their own purposes. 
Smugglers’ partners  
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Border entrepreneurs are very dependent on their contacts and acquaintances for obtaining 
essential information and this generates widespread and varied information networks 
involving both Palestinians and Israelis. In addition to watchers and lookouts along West 
Bank roads and at checkpoints, smugglers also rely on their contacts within the Israeli 
administration.  
Bedouin drivers involved in smuggling Palestinian workers often belong to extended families 
which have Israeli police officers, border guards and soldiers among their relatives. As a 
result, they have opportunities for obtaining useful information on the movement of Israeli 
patrols and the location of random checkpoints and allows them to adjust their plans 
accordingly.  
Israeli settlers in the West Bank can sometimes play an important role as informers. They 
have greater ability to travel freely and this gives them very precise information on routes, 
obstacles and patrol movements. They often have developed good contacts in the army, 
because they have soldiers and officers defending the settlements billeted in their homes or, 
since the mid-1980s, they are sometimes recruited as „territorial defence auxiliaries‟ (Gordon 
2008). In order to keep their precious cheap manpower, those who employ Palestinian 
workers illegally do not hesitate to warn them and their drivers about the whereabouts of 
Israeli patrols. Furthermore, some take advantage of their privileges to smuggle Palestinians 
through Israeli check points. In autumn 2008, a 63 year-old settler from South Hebron Hill 
was arrested at a check point with two Palestinians hidden in the trunk of his car. 
After crossing into Israel, these networks are critical. They help to give undocumented 
workers some protection by providing them accommodation and hiding places. Their 
assistance is also crucial for gaining access to worksites; in 2008, a security guard responsible 
for employment procedures near Jerusalem received regular bribes from contractors to allow 
the entry of workers without proper permits (Glickman 2008). They also prevent arrests of 
undocumented teams on work sites. Between 2007 and 2010, thanks to his contacts, Ahmad 
Ga„ûd, a Palestinian contractor, was able to hold on to his team of undocumented Palestinian 
workers in a major meat factory a Negev industrial area. Because the mother of his Israeli 
partner was a local policewoman and because the owner of the factory had contacts in the 
Israeli administration, Ahmed Ga„ûd was confident that there would be few police patrols on 
his worksite. In 2008, he even managed to keep his team working on Yom Kippur when 
everybody stops working in Israel! 
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Retribution, extortion and the informal tax system 
Exchanging information and good practices comes at a cost, whether social or financial. Bilâl 
Abu Kammûne, a 30 year old Bedouin contractor from Rahat, became friendly with Israeli 
soldiers stationed at the Meitar/Wadi al-Khalil checkpoint before it was handed over to a 
private company, by inviting them several times to bars and local restaurants in Beer Sheva. 
He managed to win their confidence while convincing them that he needed to employ 
undocumented Palestinian workers. As a result, he received a pass for the Meitar check point. 
In return for their generosity, he delivered cigarette cartons. After 2006, when the army and 
police officers were gradually replaced by private security guards on most West Bank 
checkpoints (Havkin 2011), these forms of corruption continued: for example, in 2008, with 
help from local private guards, several merchants from Hebron were able to smuggle their 
goods through southern checkpoints.  
In some instances, Israeli civil servants extort kickbacks from Palestinian workers. Taking 
advantage of their acquaintances among Palestinian workers and their ability to provide 
passes, they obtain useful services for free or a very low fee. In 2005, workers from Samu‟ 
were summoned by a Bedouin border guard living in Beer Sheva to repaint his house. He 
went to fetch them from the West Bank and took them across the checkpoint in his police car. 
After they finished, he asked them to leave immediately without payment and threatened to 
arrest them for entering Israel illegally! 
Israeli soldiers, civil servants and private guards are not the only people to capitalize on their 
power and position. In 2009, a Bethlehem worker described how West Bank Palestinians in 
contact with smugglers were regularly paid for providing critical information or making 
contact with undocumented workers. Some even exploited Palestinian workers. In 2008, 
Palestinians living in Qatanna (north-east of Jerusalem) and working in the Israeli village of 
Nattaf were regularly forced to provide information on the whereabouts of their employers to 
a group of Palestinian thieves so that they could plan and time their robberies during their 
absence. 
These forms of extortion are neither exceptional, nor arbitrary; they are part of a system 
created by an informal border economy. As in many other border contexts, such payments are 
in fact an informal tax for passage (Andreas 2001): it is now almost obligatory and workers 
must be prepared to see this as part of the cost of crossing the border. This is a clear sign that 
the market is both dynamic and lucrative and that it attracts a multitude of actors, including 
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State authorities. By assisting Palestinian workers and contractors to cross into Israel and 
extorting taxes and/or services from them, a whole range of „regulatory authorities‟ – 
smugglers, private guards, Israeli civil servants and others individuals – have become part of 
this power mechanism (dispositive de pouvoir). Depending on their personal interests, they 
are in a position to open and close access to Israel and its job market.  
Informal regulatory authorities under State control 
The emergence of these informal controls has not weakened Israel‟s control of borders; rather, 
we can see that it has the capacity to redeploy its controls via informal systems.  
Contrary to official political positions with regard to Israeli and international public opinion, 
which emphasize the mobilization of State authorities in the fight against Palestinian 
„infiltrators‟ (mistanenim [in Hebrew]), Israeli civil servants have shown a certain degree of 
tolerance for the crossing of undocumented Palestinian workers, not least because they know 
that they do not have sufficient resources or manpower to stop smugglers. In 2008, in the 
region north of Jerusalem, an Israeli border patrol officer stated that 1,500 Palestinians, on 
average, jumped the Fence each week, but that he and his colleagues caught no more than 
10% of them, due to their lack of resources. Moreover, because the lack of cells and staff at 
local police stations, border guards could not afford to charge the Palestinian workers they 
arrested. In addition, Israel does not have enough magistrates to judge or enough jails to 
incarcerate the Palestinian workers crossing without a permit (B‟tselem 2007b). Finally, 
Israeli authorities know that they cannot arrest all the smugglers. The business is so lucrative 
that dismantled networks will immediately be replaced by new groups. 
For a long time, the General Security Services (Shabak), the police and the army have opted 
for infiltration of smuggling networks because they provide crucial information on Palestinian 
activities. This has high priority as a way to prevent suicide bombings and weapons 
trafficking. Smugglers already have good connections with police officers, soldiers and 
private security guards whom they attempt to corrupt in order to obtain crucial information for 
avoiding Israeli surveillance. In addition, the intelligence services often force these officers to 
play a double game while, at the same time, they recruit Palestinian workers, contractors and 
smugglers (B‟tselem 2007b). With the large number of interconnections in such a vast 
network, a few key well-positioned collaborators can obtain information on the arrival of 
unidentified participants. If arrested, undocumented workers and smugglers can face several 
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years of imprisonment and very high fines. Police, shabak and army officers are often in a 
position to force smugglers and workers to collaborate in return for their freedom. 
Instrumentation of smuggling networks gives the Israeli authorities more resources for 
curbing suicide attacks inside Israel as it allows them to monitor the networks used by 
Palestinian factions during the second Intifada. Besides, this system of informal controls has 
proved to be very efficient. Because they know they are under surveillance, smugglers are 
very careful in choosing their clients. Besides they often require newcomers to submit to 
intrusive interviews and thorough checks in order to be sure that they are not suicide bombers. 
Finally, by tolerating and controlling crossings by undocumented Palestinian workers and the 
informal economy that this has generated, Israeli authorities have managed to maintain and 
reinforce their control over border zones, Palestinian enclaves and Israeli territory.  
CONCLUSION 
Since the 1990s, the escalation of security measures and movement restrictions in the border 
zones separating Israel from the Occupied West Bank has reduced, but not stopped, the 
passage of Palestinian workers entering Israel. It has merely changed the way they cross the 
divide, not only by making the passage harder, but also by fostering the emergence of an 
informal border crossing economy. 
This economy has deep ramifications because of its impact on the local population, over and 
beyond workers and smugglers involved. There are now highly inventive entrepreneurs who 
have taken advantage of the opportunities created by the system of constraints imposed by 
Israel over the last 20 years. Their business relies on collaboration with a variety of local 
actors: watchers, drivers, building labourers, car mechanics, restaurant owners, etc. Outside 
the border zones, the sector functions thanks to the complicity of certain Israeli civil servants 
and private entrepreneurs. For an informal market, it is particularly well-integrated and 
regulated with a pragmatic and calculated distribution of spheres of influence and division of 
labour that requires a high level of coordination across borders, both in circumventing Israeli 
systems of surveillance and in managing financial issues. Finally, the participants have 
negotiated a structured framework governing competition and entry into the market, with 
assistance from recognized local authorities. 
Over this period, this informal economy has evolved into a mechanism of movement 
regulation alongside governmental structures. Not only does it facilitate the movement of 
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undocumented workers, but it also fixes prices and collects informal taxes. Furthermore, it has 
led to a reorganization of roads and staging places on the routes taken by Palestinians 
travelling between home and work. However, the State continues to maintain a certain level 
of control over the system: many smuggling networks are known and utilized by Israeli 
intelligence services and play a key role in the mechanisms for regulating Palestinian 
mobility. We must therefore reconsider how the system of border controls imposed by Israel 
on West Bank Palestinians operates as a heterogeneous power mechanism (dispositive de 
pouvoir) covering public and private, and formal and informal, actors whose activities are not 
necessarily coordinated, but highly synchronized. 
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